We propose an axiomatic approach which economically underpins the representation of dynamic preferences in terms of a stochastic utility function, sensitive to the information available to the decision maker. Our construction is recursive and based on inter-temporal preference relations, whose characterization is inpired by the original intuition given by Debreu's State Dependent Utilities (1960).
Introduction
The freedom of choice, which characterizes every human being, intervenes in many aspects of real life, determining the economical, political and financial dynamics. For this reason the rational (and mathematical) axiomatization for the agents' preferences has gained a lot of interest leading to a flourish stream of research literature (see [9] and the exhaustive list of references therein).
In this paper we aim at characterizing a family of inter-temporal preference relations in terms of a Stochastic Dynamic Utility (SDU) and a Subjective Probability. The Stochastic Dynamic Utility fluctuates randomly depending on the moments in time when the Decision Maker observes information such as market behavior, news, catastrophic shocks or any other macro/micro factor which leads to a reconsideration of personal beliefs. The main novelty with respect to related literature about the dynamic theory of choices (e.g. [4, 8, 13, 15] ), consists in providing an inter-connection between random payoffs which are defined on different instants in time, incorporating and exploiting the available information.
Indeed people are highly impatient when comparing present and future outcomes and both emotion-based and cognitive-based mechanisms contribute to inter-temporal distortions .
In [17] , Zauberman and Urminsky provide an overview of the psycological determinants of inter-temporal choice such as impulsivity, goal completion and reward timing, different evaluation of the future in terms of concreteness, time perception and many other features: "In sum, these findings establish that the way people perceive future time itself is an important factor in how they form their intertemporal preferences [...] What is common across the various factors influencing intertemporal preferences is that all these mechanisms influence the relative attractiveness of achieving a present goal compared to a later more distant one. "(see [17] , p. 139)
From an economical and mathematical point of view the idea of preference relations which can depend on the future state of nature goes back to the seminal celebrated paper [2] . Debreu gave an axiomatic setup (on a finite state spaces) under which the preferences were represented by a so-called state dependent utility function (see Theorem 5.3 , in the Appendix for the statement and [7] for further developments). State dependent preferences are sensitive to the random outcomes that may occur in the future and therefore the agent subjective utility may be affected by different future scenarios related to the occurrence of specific events. In many areas, the restriction to finitely many states of nature is undesirable as in the modelling of financial markets. In [16] , Wakker and Zank provided an extension of Debreu's result from finite to infinite dimension, for the special case of real-valued outcomes and monotonic preferences. The development of their extended functional, additively decomposable on infinite-dimensional spaces, leads to a numerical representation of the preferences in term of a stochastic utility function u and a probability P (see Theorem 5.5, Appendix) . The main results in [16] (and [1] ) will indeed play a key role in our development of inter-temporal preferences.
In the financial framework the classical backward approach to utility maximization has recently been argued in a series of paper by Musiela and Zariphopoulou starting from [10] and a novel forward theory has been proposed: the utility function is stochastic, time dependent and moves forward. In this theory, the forward utility (which replaces the indirect utility of the classic case) is built through the underlying financial market and must satisfy some appropriate martingale conditions. Inspired by this idea, Frittelli and Maggis [6] studied the conditional (dynamic) version of the classical notion of certainty equivalent (as defined in [12] ). The preliminary object is a stochastic dynamic utility u(t, x, ω) -i.e. a stochastic field -representing the evolution of the preferences of the agent. The novelty in [6] is that the (backward) conditional certainty equivalent, represents the time-s-value of the time-t-claim X, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t < ∞, capturing in this way the inter-temporal nature of preferences. Unfortunately any axiomatization of inter-temporal preferences which justifies the representation in terms of stochastic dynamic utilities is still missing in the literature and this paper aims at filling this empty gap.
The key ingredients of inter-temporal preferences (ITP) can be summarized by four elements: first the information at each time are described by the existence of a filtration {F t } t∈[0,+∞) , i.e. a family of sigma algebras such that F s ⊆ F t for s ≤ t. Second, as ITP compares random payoffs which live at different times, we shall need to introduce a binary relation s,t (resp. s,t ) for s < t being two points in times. In particular g s,t f will mean that the F t -measurable payoff f (which will be fully revealed at time t) is preferred to the F s -measurable g, conditioned to the knowledge of the information available at time s (Similar for g s,t f ). Third the preference relation s,t is not total if the full information F s are not yet disclosed. The notion of conditional preferences as introduced in [3] becomes therefore an important tool to understand the nature of ITP. Finally we will assume that the agent observes real information only through a discretisation of the time line, namely t 0 = 0 < t 1 < ... < t n < . . .. We observe that in [3] a probability on the conditional sigma algebra was assumed to exist a priori. In our approach this requirement is not necessary, but we rather derive step by step a new probability update which follows directly from the decision theory structure we are choosing.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe the set of Axioms characterizing ITP and state the main representation result. In Section 3 we prove the result in the simplest unconditioned case (for trivial initial information). The aim of Section 3 is twofold: on one hand it will serve as initial step of the induction argument we present in Section 4 to obtain the complete proof of our main Theorem 2.7. On the other hand is written in a self-contained manner, so that it can be read and understood independently from the general conditional setting.
Inter-temporal preferences
Notations. We fix e measure space (Ω, F) where Ω recollects all the possible simple events and F is a sigma algebra of compound measurable events. We shall model information over time by the existence of an arbitrary filtration {F t } t∈[0,+∞) , with F t ⊆ F for every t. For any given sigma algebra G ⊆ F we denote by L(G) the space of G-measurable functions taking values in R (usually called random variables or acts) and by L ∞ (G) its subspace collecting bounded elements. On L(G) and L ∞ (G) we shall consider the usual pointwise order f ≤ g if and only if f (ω) ≤ g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω and similarly f < g if and only if f (ω) < g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. Given two elements f, g ∈ L ∞ (G) we use the notation f ∨ g, f ∧ g to indicate respectively the minimum and the maximum between f and g. For a countable family of acts {f n } n∈N ⊆ L ∞ (G) we consider the inf n f n , sup n f n the pointwise infimum/supremum of the family and recall that if the family is uniformly bounded then inf n f n , sup n f n are elements of L ∞ (G). L ∞ (G) endowed with the sup norm · ∞ becomes a Banach lattice, where f ∞ = sup ω∈Ω |f (ω)|. By 1 A , A ∈ G we indicate the element of L ∞ (G) such that 1 A (ω) = 1 if ω ∈ A and 0 otherwise. For f ∈ L ∞ (G) and
A ∈ G, f 1 A denotes the restriction of f to A; for any acts f, g and event A, f 1 A + g1 A c denotes the act that agrees with f on A and with g on A c . Constant acts are identified with their associated outcomes.
Let G 1 ⊂ G 2 be two sigma algebras. For a finite partition {A 1 , ..., A n } ⊂ G 2 of Ω and {g j } n j=1 ⊂ L ∞ (G 1 ), n j=1 g j 1 A j denotes the act assigning g j on A j , ∀j = 1, ..., n. Such an act, is called simple act conditional to G 1 and S G 1 (G 2 ) denotes the space of this kind of conditional simple acts. The standard notion of simple acts can be obtained when G 1 = {∅, Ω} and the corresponding space will be denoted by S(G 2 ).
Whenever a probability P is given (Ω, F, P) becomes a measure space and as usual we shall say that a probability P is dominated by P ( P ≪ P) if P(A) = 0 implies P(A) = 0 for A ∈ F. Similarly a probability P is equivalent to P ( P ∼ P) if P ≪ P and P ≪ P. A property holds P almost surely (P-a.s.), if the set where it fails has 0 probability.
For any given sigma algebra G ⊆ F we shall denote with L 0 (Ω, G, P) the space of equivalence classes of G measurable random variables that are P almost surely equal and by L ∞ (Ω, G, P) the subspace of (P a.s.) bounded random variables. Moreover the essential (P a.s.) supremum of an arbitrary family of random variables {X λ } λ∈Λ ⊆ L 0 (Ω, G, P) will be simply denoted by P − sup{X λ | λ ∈ Λ}, and similarly for the essential infimum (see [5] Section A.5 for reference). Finally the space of P integrable random variables will be denoted by L 1 (Ω, G, P). We use the standard notation and indicate by E P [X] the Lebesgue integral of X ∈ L 1 (Ω, G, P). Moreover if H is a sigma algebra contained in G then E P [X | H] denotes the conditional expectation of X given H and P |H the restriction of the probability P on the smaller sigma algebra H.
A toy example: state dependent utility and the role of conditional information.
Two brothers E, Y are inheriting from their old and rich grandmother. The elder brother E is asked to choose between receiving 1 million Euros immediately (at time t = 0), or waiting two years (time t 2 ) when his grandmother will move to the rest home in Sardinia and earn her wonderful villa near the Como Lake. Alternatively E could wait until the intermediate time t 1 to make up his decision, but in any case the younger brother Y will have to accept what is left from E after his decision is taken.
The value of the villa at time 0 is equal to 1 million, but of course it makes little sense to compare the two values today since the villa will be available only at t 2 .
Now assume that at time t 1 election for the new Italian Government will take place and the catastrophic event of Italy leaving the European Union (with a consequent default of its economic system) may occur. Call this event A and set F t 1 = {∅, Ω, A, A c }. Brother E knows that if A c will occurs the value of the villa will increase to 1.11 · 10 6 , but in case of default it will fall down to 2 · 10 5 . The probability of the default event A is low but not negligible, say P(A) = 0.01. Finally the probability of defaulting at time t 2 (call this event D) knowing that A c occurred is almost negligible, for instance P(D | A c ) = 10 −6 (in which case the villa would be worth again 2 · 10 5 ). In case that a default did not occur neither at time t 1 nor at time t 2 then the value of the villa at t 2 would jump up to 1.8·10 6 . Information at time t 2 are therefore described by F t 2 the sigma algebra generated by {A, D}.
Agent E is assumed to be risk neutral as far as Italy is not defaulting i.e. u(x) = x. In case of a default (either at time t 1 or t 2 ) his utility function would beũ(x) = 1 2 x if x ≥ 0 orũ(x) = 2x if x < 0 . The naive idea is that once the default has occurred the agent give more importance in avoiding losses, rather than gaining money. We can synthesize this reasoning by introducing the stochastic dynamic utility as follows
We make the following considerations.
• If agent E compares the choice between getting 10 6 today or the villa at time t 2 , then he is comparing the utility u 0 (10 6 ) = 10 6 with respect to the expected utility of the payoff at time t 2 given by Expected payoff = 1.8 · 10 6 · (1 − 10 −2 − 10 −6 ) + 1 2 · 2 · 10 5 · (10 −2 + 10 −6 ).
This Expected payoff is strictly greater than 10 6 and indeed if E neglects the intermediate time t 1 then he will choose for the villa instead of immediate money. But this impulsive strategy would not lead to an optimal solution.
• Assume now that the agent first compare 10 6 with the value of the villa at time t 1 .
Then Expected payoff = 1.11 · 10 6 · 0.9 + 1 2 · 2 · 10 5 · 0.01 = 10 6 .
This means that the expected value of the villa at time t 1 is the same of the cash amount of money which means that E is indifferent between taking the decision today (t = 0) or tomorrow (t 1 ). Therefore he has better waiting until the elections take place and distinguish between even A or A c . In the former case E will choose 10 6 which is in fact better than the value of the villa. In the second case he will prefer obtaining the villa at time t 2 rather than 10 6 at time t 1 . Clearly this second strategy provide an optimal final profile, since it exploits the additional intermediate
information.
An axiomatization of inter-temporal preferences. We consider a time interval [0, +∞), together with a fixed (countable) family of updating times t 0 = 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n < . . . ,. At each t i the agent shall reconsider her preference relations depending on the information observed. In particular at time t 0 = 0 no information are available, i.e.
F 0 = {∅, Ω}. Information at each time t is represented by a sigma algebra F t and since information increase in time we shall have F s ⊆ F t for every s ≤ t.
Assumption 2.1. We shall always assume throughout the paper that the agent is endowed by some initial preference relation, described by an utility function u 0 : R → R which is strictly increasing (not necessarily concave). For simplicity we will consider the case u 0 (0) = 0.
The time t 1 represents the first instant at which the agent observes available information which will potentially influence her decision. Random payoffs at time t 1 are described by random variables in L ∞ (F t 1 ) and the agent compares these random payoffs with initial sure positions represented by elements in R. In Section 3 we shall provide the representation of an inter-temporal preference connecting the initial time t 0 = 0 to t 1 . Indeed the new inpunts will affects her attitude towards decisions, generating a new utility u 1 which will depend on the state of nature realised. Once time t 1 is reached she will start considering a new aim in the next future, say t 2 , and compare random payoffs, known at time t 1 , with those which will depend on events occurring at time t 2 . From the t 0 perspective the new intertemporal preference 1,2 will be a conditional preference relation which incorporate the further knowledge reached at time t 1 . We shall follow the idea proposed by [3] , exploiting some of the techniques there developed. This procedure will repeat iteratively at every interval from t i to t i+1 and for this reason our main result will be proved by induction over updating times. Each updating step from t i to t i+1 will be characterized by a preference interconnection i,i+1 (or i,i+1 ) satisfying conditional transition axioms.
Of course since the proof proceeds by induction we will assume that we reached the desired representation up to step t i and show the representation at the succeeding time t i+1 . This will guarantee the existence of a probability P i only on the sigma algebra F t i , which we will need to update to the larger sigma algebra F t i+1 following a Bayesian paradigm.
For the statement of Theorem 2.7, we fix an arbitrary N and a family of inter-temporal preference relations i,i+1 for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 with the following meaning: for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) and f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) we say that g i,i+1 f if the agent prefers to hold the gamble g at time t i than the gamble f at time t i+1 , knowing all the information provided at time t i ( similarly for g i,i+1 f ).
As usual we say that
f and g i,i+1 f and define the family of null events for every i = 1, . . . , N as
The transition Axiom. We are now ready to introduce the first Axiom characterizing the Inter Temporal Preferences.
Before giving an explanation of (T.i) in its full generality, we observe that in the unconditioned case (i = 0) it reduces to (T.0) Transition preference relation 0,1 .
3. normalized: 0 ∼ 0,1 0 (i.e. 0 0,1 0 and 0 0,1 0).
non-degenerate
: for any f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) there exist y, z ∈ R such that y 0,1 f and x 0,1 f .
In this case the first Axiom (T.0) is composed only by four requirements: completeness and transitivity are the natural counterpart suggested by the classical definition of weak order. Normalization states that "holding nothing "is indifferent throughout time. Non degeneracy is the more technical one and guarantees some simplifications in the our arguments since it implies that any bounded random payoff at time t 1 admits a sure value today which is more/less preferred (it is nevertheless a very weak requirement which is satisfied in all the cases of interest). Axiom (T.i) points 1, 5 and 6 are deeply related and inspired to the notion of conditional preference in [3] . In particular we shall see in Lemma 4.3 (which is the counterpart of Lemma 3.2 in [3] ) that locally completeness allows to compare two acts on three disjoint F t i measurable events. Consistency and stability can be understood in terms of information achieved: for example consistency states that if the agent prefer
The definition of Conditional Certainty Equivalent is the basis of our main representation results and follows from the idea in [6] . In Section 4 we shall show by induction the existence (and uniqueness) of the Conditional Certainty Equivalent at each time step.
then we shall call g the Conditional Certainty Equivalent of f and denote the family of all CCEs as C i,i+1 (f ).
Notation 2.5.
In what follows we shall use these notations for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) and
Remark 2.6. We observe that consistency and stability of i,i+1 (similar for i,i+1 ) imply the following pasting properties:
• for a family {A n } n∈N ⊆ F t i and A = ∪ n A n we have
Additional Axioms and representation of Inter Temporal Preferences. The following Axioms we will take into consideration are monotonicity, the Sure Thing Principle and a technical continuity, adapted to this conditional setting, which will lead to a representation of the ITP in the desired integral form.
and g 1 < g 2 :
(C.i) Pointwise continuity. Consider any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t i+1 ), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω, then for any
We are now ready to state the main contribution of this paper: Theorem 2.7 provides the representation of ITP in terms of a unique probability P and a stochastic field u(t, x, ω), which describes the random fluctuations of preferences. 
is strictly increasing in x and u(t i , 0, ω) = 0 1 , for all ω ∈ Ω;
Relative uniqueness: the couple (P, u) can be replaced by (P * , u * ) if and only if P is equivalent to P * on F t N and for any i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u * (t i , ·, ·) = δ i u i ) = 1, where δ i is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P |Ft i with respect to P * |Ft i .
Since the proof of Theorem 2.7 will proceed inductively we choose to present the theory in the simpler unconditioned case 0,1 (see Section 3). The results in the next section will be therefore necessary to prove the initial step in the induction argument of Theorem 2.7.
Unconditioned inter-temporal preference
We consider a Decision Maker who compares an initial amount of some good, whose value is surely determined (and its benefit is immediate) with respect to a bounded random payoffs (e.g. bets, assets, future value of goods) at a fixed time t 1 represented by elements in the space L ∞ (F t 1 ). We say that the agent is initially naive, as the initial information are represented by the trivial F 0 = {∅, Ω} and therefore the space L ∞ (F 0 ) is isometric to the real line R.
Consider the transition preference 0,1 (or 0,1 ) which connects and L ∞ (F t 1 ) to L ∞ (F 0 ). As already observed (see f , a ≻ 0,1 f , a ≺ 0,1 f , for any a ∈ R and f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ).
We also recall that the set of null events induced by 0,1 is given by
Definition 3.2. If a ∼ 0,1 f then we shall call a the (Conditional) Certainty Equivalent of f and denote the family of all CCEs as C 0,1 (f ).
We now show that under (T.0) the CCE exists and is unique. Notice that this notion of certainty equivalent matches the dynamic generalization introduced by [6] . The CCE will also provide a natural representation of the inter-temporal preference 0,1 (see the following Proposition 3.5).
Consider the maps
Moreover as u 0 is assumed to be strictly increasing then
Proof. From completeness V ± 1 are well defined and taking values in R ∪ {±∞}. The fact that V ± 1 (f ) are finite for any f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) follows from non degeneracy in Axiom (T.0). For any a, b ∈ R such that a 0,1 f and b 0,1 f we have u 0 (a) ≤ u 0 (b) and therefore
. From completeness either c 0,1 f or c 0,1 f getting in both cases a contradiction since sup{u 0 (a) | a 0,1 f } < u 0 (c) < inf{u 0 (a) | a 0,1 f }. Proposition 3.5. Assume (T.0) holds. Then for any f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) there exists a unique Conditional Certainty Equivalent given by C 0,1 (f ) = u −1 0 V 1 (f ). Moreover V 1 represents the transition order i.e.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 3.3 and Assumption 2.1. Notice that a 0,1 f (resp. a 0,1 f ) obviously implies u 0 (a) ≤ V 1 (f ) (resp. u 0 (a) ≥ V 1 (f )). For the reverse implication we can observe that u 0 (a) = V 1 (f ) implies a ∼ 0,1 f .
If instead u 0 (a) < V 1 (f ) (resp. u 0 (a) > V 1 (f )) then necessary a ≺ 0,1 f (resp. a ≻ 0,1 f ) as
The following Axioms we will take into consideration are monotonicity, the Sure Thing Principle and a technical continuity, which we recall here to clarify their meaning in this simplified unconditioned case.
(M.0) Strict Monotonicity: for all a, b, c ∈ R, A ∈ F t 1 \ N (F t 1 ) and a < b we have
(ST.0) Sure-Thing Principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ S(F t 1 ), A ∈ F t 1 \ N (F t 1 ) and
a ∈ R such that a 0,1 f 1 A + h1 A c and a 0,1 g1 A + h1 A c then for any k ∈ S(F t 1 )
(C.0) Pointwise continuity: consider any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t 1 ), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω, then for all a ≺ 0,1 f (resp. a ≻ 0,1 f ) there exists N such that a 0,1 f n (resp. a 0,1 f n ) for n > N .
Remark 3.6. In the classical Decision Theory (see [11] ) the Sure-Thing Principle is a sort of independence principle: it says that the preference between two acts, f and g, should only depend on the values of f and g when they differ. If f and g differ only on an event A, if A does not occur f and g result in the same outcome exactly. In our inter-temporal framework the interpretation is exactly the same, even though we need to deal with the comparison at time 0. 
The following uniqueness holds for (3.5) : (P 1 , u 1 ) can be replaced by (P * , u * ) if and only if P 1 is equivalent to P * and P 1 (u * = δu 1 + τ ) = 1, where δ is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P 1 with respect to P * and τ ∈ L(F t 1 ) with E P * [τ ] = 0.
Remark 3.9. We observe that even if not mentioned explicitly, necessarily the random variable u 1 (x, ·) is integrable with respect to P 1 for any x ∈ R.
Moreover if we impose the normalization requirement u 1 (0, ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ Ω then necessarily τ is equal to 0 pointwise.
Proof. We define a weak order on L ∞ (F t 1 ) as f g if and only if
implies is complete, reflexive and transitive (i.e. satisfies (A1) in the Appendix).
Let f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) and outcomes x > y:
, for all nonnull events A ∈ F t 1 and hence is strictly monotone in the sense of (A2). Similarly (ST.0) implies (A3).
Let now {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t 1 ), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω and f n ∞ < k for all n ∈ N. Notice that u n := sup k≥n f k ∨ f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ), l n := inf k≥n f k ∧ f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) and
u n ≥ f n ≥ l n , u n ≥ f ≥ l n Moreover both u n (ω) → f (ω) and l n (ω) → f (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. From (M.0)
. This also implies that satisfies (A4).
We can therefore apply Theorem 5.5 and find the desired representation (3.5) namely
and the relatively uniqueness. Let therefore P * and u * (·, ·) = τ + σδu 1 (·, ·) obtained by Theorem 5.5. Observe that
Remark 3.10. In virtue of Assumption 2.1 we shall impose u 1 (0, ω) = 0 for any ω ∈ Ω and therefore τ will be always neglected.
Even though it is not mentioned explicitly E P 1 [|u 1 (x)|] < ∞ for any x ∈ R.
Inductive proof of Theorem 2.7
This section is entirely devoted to the proof of the main Theorem of this paper.
On the direct implication (⇒). We shall proceed by induction.
In fact if N = 1 Theorem 2.7 reduces to Proposition 3.8, which is proved in the previous Section 3.
Assumption 4.1.
[Induction] We assume that the statement is true up to i: in particular it means that we can guarantee the existence of a probability P i on F t i and stochastic utility
is F t k -measurable, integrable, strictly increasing in x, u k (0, ·) = 0 and such that for f ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F t k−1 ), g ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F t k )
for any k = 1, . . . , i.
Under this assumption we shall now prove that the representation can be forwardly updated to time t i+1 .
are the null sets induced by the relations i−1,i , i−1,i as in (2.1).
Although a conditional preference is not total, the following lemma, which is inspired by Lemma 3.2 in [3] , shows that local completeness allows to derive for every two acts an F t i -measurable partition on which a comparison can be achieved. 
for every n which implies P i (∪ n A n ) = S (from (T.i) and Remark 2.6 we have ∪ n A n ∈ E).
We finally show that up to null events ∪ n A n represents the largest event on which g is conditionally equivalent to f : letÃ ∈ E and B =Ã \ (∪ n A n ). Then B ∪ (∪ n A n ) ∈ E and P i (B ∪ (∪ n A n )) = P i (B) + S. Necessarily P i (B) = 0.
We therefore set A := ∪ n A n and consider U :
Notice that from the construction of A if we findB ∈ U such that g1B ∼ i,i+1 f 1B then P i (B) = 0. Following the same argument as in the previous step we construct a maximal B ∈ U such that P i (B) ≥ P i (B) for allB ∈ U : indeed it is not possible the finding of
f 1C} and following the same reasoning we can find C ∈ D such that P i (C) ≥ P i (C) for allC ∈ D and g ≺ C i,i+1 f . By construction P i (A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1 and the probability of the intersections is always 0.
Consider for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) the upper and lower level sets 
Notation 4.5. We shall often use the notation u −1
Proof. Let g 1 , g 2 ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) such that P i (g 1 = g 2 ) = 1. We have from Remark 2.6 that C u g 1 = C u g 2 and C l g 1 = C l g 2 and therefore V + i+1 , V − i+1 are well defined. From now on we fix f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ): for any g 1 , g 2 ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) such that g 1 i,i+1 f and g 2 i,i+1 f then the set {g 1 > g 2 } ∈ N (F t i ). From the monotonicity of u i we have
Observe that if P i (Ā) = 0 we have the thesis. Otherwise we claim that for any B ⊆Ā,
This claim indeed contradicts local completeness in (T.i).
To show the claim we consider first the case g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B for some B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0, since the other follows in a similar way. As a consequence of Remark 2.6 we have
Therefore g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B cannot occur for any for B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0.
Similarly we can obtain that g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B cannot occur for any for B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0, concluding the proof of the claim. Notation 4.6. From now on we shall denote V i+1 :
Proposition 4.7. Let Assumption 4.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). Then for any
there exists a unique Conditional Certainty Equivalent given by
represents the transition order i.e.
and necessarily V i+1 (f ) ∈ L 1 (Ω, F t i , P i ).
Proof. In this proof we denote (with a slight abuse of notation) by V i+1 (f ) any of its F t i -measurable version. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 4.4.
We only need to show that
For any couple g 1 , g 2 ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) such that g 1 i,i+1 f and g 2 i,i+1 f we can observe that u i (g 1 ) ≤
V i+1 (f ) ≤ u i (g 2 ), P i almost surely, which automatically implies V i+1 (f ) ∈ L 1 (Ω, F t i , P i ) (we are assuming u i (·, x) is integrable for any x). At the same time from u i strictly increasing in x we can deduce g 1 ≤ C i,i+1 (f ) ≤ g 2 , P i almost surely.
To show the representation property (4.6) and (4.7), we consider the case g i,i+1 f as
). For the reverse implication notice that on the set
f } (This can be easily verified applying (T.i)). 
Proof. From the previous construction we have
, P i almost surely and hence the thesis. 
Last step of the proof for (⇒): Let Assumption 4.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies all the Axioms (T.i), (M.i), (ST.i) and (C.i). In order to conclude the proof we show that there exist a probability P i+1 on (Ω, F t i+1 ) which agrees with P i on F t i and a stochastic utility
We define an inter-temporal preference relation between time 0 and t i+1 as a 0,i+1 f
Simple inspections show that 0,i+1 satisfies (T.0), (M.0) and (ST.0).
We now prove the continuity (C.0): consider any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆
, such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Consider a ≺ 0,i+1 f (the case a ≻ 0,i+1 f follows in a similar way) so that we necessarily have u 0 (a)
Since g ≺ i,i+1 f we apply (C.i) and find a sequence of indexes {n k } ∞ k=1 and a partition {A k } ∞ k=1 ⊂ F t i such that for any k we have g1 A k i,i+1 f n 1 A k for all n ≥ n k .
)| and pointwise converges to u i (g). From Dominated Convergence Theorem we can findN such that
which shows (C.0) of 0,i+1 .
Given this premise we can apply Proposition 5.5 and find a probability P on F t i+1 and a stochastic utility u such that
Notice from (T.i) point 3 that P is equivalent to P i on F t i . For P |Ft i being the restriction of
dP i+1 u(ω, x) and notice that P i+1 (A) = P i (A) for any A ∈ F t i . We have
so that we can obtain for every A ∈ F t i that
which implies the representation (4.8).
On the reverse implication (⇐). We now assume that there exist a probability P on The only critical point is showing property (C.i). To this aim let {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) be a uniformly bounded sequence, such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Choose any
As f n ∞ < d for all n ∈ N we build the increasing sequence l n := inf k≥n f k ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) and notice l n ≤ f n and l n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Moreover l n ∞ < d for all n ∈ N and consequently |u(t i+1 , l n )| ≤ |u(t i+1 , d)| which is integrable. We can apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem for conditional expectation and obtain
(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω (by choosing an opportune version of the conditional expectation). Consider the sequence of sets {B n } n∈N ⊂ F t i defined by
Indeed ∪ k B k = Ω from the pointwise convergence and we deduce that the pairwise disjoint
A i ) satisfies again ∪ k A k = Ω and forms therefore a partition of Ω. We conclude observing that for any n ≥ k we have f n ≥ l k and therefore
The argument repeats in the same way when g ≻ i,i+1 f .
On the uniqueness. To conclude the proof we need to show the relative uniqueness.
Consider the new couple (P * , u * ) such that P is equivalent to P * on F t N and for any i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u * (t i , ·, ·) = δ i u i ) = 1, where δ i is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P |Ft i with respect to P * |Ft i . We show for any arbitrary i = 1, . . . , N −1, g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ), f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) the first of the following equivalences
as the second one is similar. To this aim we recall the martingality property
and the conditional change of measure
Moreover the equivalence between P and P * allows to write the following inequalities indifferently in the P/P * almost sure sense so that we obtain
On the contrary suppose that (P * , u * ) are given in a way such that for i = 1, . . . , N :
for all ω ∈ Ω and
. The equivalence of P and P * follows immediately. Moreover for any ω ∈ Ω we imposed u(t i , 0, ω) = u * (t i , 0, ω) = 0. For i = 1
we already know P(u * (t 1 , ·, ·) = δ 1 u 1 ) = 1 from Proposition 3.8. Let δ i = E P * dP dP * | F t i as before and consider the first i = 2, . . . , N such that either the set
Let C i−1,i (1 A ) be the CCE of 1 A so that u * (t i−1 , C i−1,i (1 A )) = E P * [u * (t i , 1 A )|F t i−1 ] P * -a.s. and
Subtracting the two equations would lead to a contradiction since the left hand side is always equal to 0 (P-a.s.) whereas the right hand side is not.
Appendix
As in the rest of the paper (Ω, F) denotes a measurable space and L ∞ (F) is the space of all acts, represented by real valued F-measurable and bounded random variables.
In this appendix the preference relation is a binary relation on L ∞ (F) : for f , g ∈ L ∞ (F), if f is preferred to g, write f g. The preference relation satisfies the following axioms:
(A1) Preference order: if it is reflexive (∀f ∈ L ∞ (F), f ∼ f ), complete (∀f, g ∈ L ∞ (F), 2. An event A ∈ F is null if f 1 A + g1 A c ∼ g ∀f, g ∈ L ∞ (F).We shall denote by N (F) be the set of null events.
As a consequence a -atom is an element A ∈ F such that for every B ∈ F with ∅ = B ⊂ A either B or A \ B is null.
An event is essential if it belongs to F \ N (F).
We can consider the following additional Axioms:
(A2) Strictly monotone if x1 A + f 1 A c ≻ y1 A + f 1 A c , for all nonnull events A ∈ F, for all f ∈ L ∞ (F) and outcomes x > y.
(A3) Sure-thing principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ L ∞ (F) and A ∈ F such that
(A3) holds on S(F) if we substitute in the previous statement L ∞ (F) with S(F). Let L ∞ (F) the set of acts and a preference relation on it. Let the state space Ω = {ω 1 , ..., ω n }, where at least three states are nonnull. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) There exist n continuous functions V j : R → R, j = 1, ..., n, that are strictly increasing for all nonnull states and constant for all null states, and such that is represented by
V j (f (ω j )). (5.9) (ii) is a norm continuous, strictly monotonic preference order that satisfies the sure thing principle.
The following uniqueness holds for (1) : W (f ) = n j=1 W j (f (ω j )) represent if and only if there exist τ 1 , ..., τ n ∈ R and σ > 0 such that W j = τ j + σV j ∀j, implying that W = τ + σV for τ = τ 1 + ... + τ n .
In [16] the previous Theorem is generalized to an infinite state spaces Ω when Ω contains no atoms. We here recall the integral reformulation of the Debreu representation given in [1] under pointwise continuity.
Definition 5.4. A preference order is (A4) Pointwise continuous if for any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω then ∀g ∈ L ∞ (F) such that g ≻ f (resp. g ≺ f )
∃J ∈ N such that g ≻ f j (resp. g ≺ f j ) ∀j > J.
Theorem 5.5 ([16] , Theorem 12 and [1], Theorem 5). Let L ∞ (F) be the set of acts and the preference relation on it. Assume that F contains at least three disjoint essential events. Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
